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The proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements has arguably been the main 
change to the international trading system since the end of the Uruguay Round in the mid-
1990s. We argue that investment discrimination plays a major role in this development. 
Preferential trade agreements can lead to investment discrimination because of tariff 
differentials on intermediary products and as result of provisions that relax investment rules 
for the parties to the agreement. Excluded countries are sensitive to the costs that this 
investment discrimination imposes on domestic firms and react by signing a trade agreement 
that aims at leveling the playing field. We test our argument using a spatial econometric 
model and a newly compiled dataset that includes 166 countries and covers a period of 18 
years (1990-2007). Our findings strongly support the argument that investment discrimination 
is a major driver of the proliferation of trade agreements. 
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Introduction 
Over the last few decades foreign direct investments (FDI) have increased rapidly. In 2009, 
the foreign affiliates of 82,000 transnational corporations contributed no less than 11 percent 
of global gross domestic product (UNCTAD 2010b, xviii). By contrast, in the early 1990s the 
number of transnational corporations stood at only 35,000 (UNCTAD 1992, 11). Much of the 
recent growth in FDI has been driven by developing and transition countries, which accounted 
for about half of the global FDI inflows by 2010 and also increasingly are home countries of 
transnational corporations that invest abroad. Scholars have analyzed both the reasons for the 
growth of FDI and the consequences of this trend for economic growth, tax competition and 
the environment. Interestingly, however, relatively little attention has been devoted to the 
question whether the growth and global spread of FDI has consequences for countries’ trade 
policies. 
Taking up this question, we argue that the internationalization of production has been 
one of the driving forces of the spread of bilateral and regional trade agreements across the 
globe that has taken place in parallel to the growth in FDI. In particular, we maintain that 
protection against the loss of foreign direct investments (FDI) has been an important rationale 
for the pursuit of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Such agreements may produce 
investment discrimination if they lead to a spread in tariffs on intermediate goods from PTA 
partner countries and from third countries or contain provisions that preferentially liberalize 
investment policies for partners to the agreement. Governments in excluded countries are 
likely to react to the costs imposed by investment discrimination on their internationally 
active firms. An agreement with the country in which investors face discrimination helps 
domestic firms by reestablishing the competitive situation that existed before the conclusion 
of the initial agreement. The expectation thus is for trade agreements to spread in parallel to 
the growth of FDI, with capital exporting countries signing agreements with capital importing 
countries that recently concluded an agreement with another capital exporting country. Our 
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argument further suggests that a.) the investment discrimination effect should be strongest for 
dyads with a large amount of trade in intermediate goods and b.) PTAs with investment 
chapters should have a particularly large effect on third countries. 
We test our argument quantitatively for 166 countries and a period of 18 years (1990-
2007). Using spatial econometric tools, we find strong support for our hypothesis and three 
corollaries. The results are very robust to various changes in operationalization and estimation 
techniques. Moreover, we show that the effect of investment discrimination is substantively 
important. Interestingly, these results show that the domestic demand for PTAs depends not 
only on the on the size of the country’s outward stocks of FDI, but also on other countries 
signing PTAs. The policies adopted by different countries thus are interdependent because 
societal interests respond to the policies pursued by other countries. This result speaks to a 
growing literature on the diffusion of policies (see, for example, Elkins et al. 2006). 
Our paper also contributes to an emerging literature on the politics of FDI by 
highlighting the important role that the aim of protecting outward stocks of FDI (and not only 
of attracting foreign investments) plays in shaping countries’ economic policies. In fact, we 
found little evidence that competition over the attraction of foreign investments plays a major 
role in the recent proliferation of PTAs. Finally, our results show that the design of PTAs 
matters. PTAs with investment provisions have a larger impact on third countries than PTAs 
without investment provisions.  
 
Foreign Direct Investments and Preferential Trade Agreements 
Companies invest abroad for one of three reasons: access to markets (market-seeking FDI), 
differences in factor prices and/or regulatory standards (efficiency-seeking FDI), and access 
to natural resources (resource-seeking FDI). Market-seeking FDI results from companies 
trying to get better access to a foreign market. In the manufacturing sector, such market-
seeking FDI is likely if a country or trading entity has high tariffs on imports of manufactured 
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goods or if the costs of transport of a good are very high. Market-seeking FDI is also 
important in the services sector, as the provision of many services depends on the geographic 
proximity between provider and consumer. For example, the provision of telecommunication 
services nearly always requires investments in infrastructure in the foreign market. 
Differences in labor costs, production-related standards, political stability, and other 
locational advantages can drive efficiency-seeking FDI. Finally, resource-seeking FDI aims at 
the extraction and use of natural resources, including soil for agricultural production. 
The past twenty years have seen a rapid increase in (stocks of) foreign investments 
(see Figure 1).1 World outward stocks of FDI increased from $1,786 billion in 1990 to 
$16,227 billion in 2007, a growth by just over 800 percent, mainly driven by investments in 
the services sector. Importantly, over this period the share of FDI located in and originating 
from developing countries has increased as well. In 2010, developing and transition countries 
accounted for 35 per cent of FDI inward and 18 per cent of outward stocks as compared to 
about 25 percent of inward and 7 percent of outward stocks in 1990.2  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In parallel to the growth in FDI, the number of PTAs has also grown very rapidly, with 
247 new free trade agreements being signed over the eighteen-year period from 1990 to 2007 
(not counting agreements that deepen or replace existing commitments). Whereas following 
our data in 1990 only 245 dyads had a working preferential trade link between them, in 2007 
this number stood at 2,123, a growth of about 750 percent. This development has continued 
                                                 
1
 We use stocks in our analysis; however, the trend for flows is very similar to the one shown in Figure 1, with 
the exception that values fluctuate more strongly over time, for example flows declined between 2000 and 2003. 
2
 Data from http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ (December 1, 2011). 
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for the past few years, with member countries of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
notifying that organization of no fewer than 15 new agreements in 2011.3 Initially, most of 
these agreements were signed among geographically-close developed countries, especially in 
Europe. Increasingly, however, also countries outside of Europe and geographically-distant 
country pairs have participated in this wave of preferentialism in international trade (Manger 
et al. 2012). In fact, of the agreements notified in 2011, only one is purely located within 
Europe, and nine included countries from different continents. 
The two trends for FDI stocks and PTAs thus share important similarities in terms of 
both monotonic growth and increasing globalization. Evidently, this correlation between the 
two developments alone is not sufficient to establish causality. There are, however, good 
theoretical reasons to expect a causal relationship between them. In fact, PTAs may be both a 
stimulus for further FDI (with companies drawn to countries with PTAs) and a reaction to an 
increase in FDI (with companies asking for a PTA after setting up production facilities in a 
country). Despite the theoretical plausibility of these relationships, only a relatively small 
number of studies have looked at the FDI-PTAs nexus. 
On the one hand, a few studies argue that PTAs attract FDI inflows. The basic idea 
behind this argument is that to appeal to foreign investors, especially developing countries 
have “to provide certainty and credibility as to the direction of future policies and the 
economic environment more generally” (Fernández and Portes 1998, 217). Countries may 
then use PTAs as a commitment and signaling device that serves as a guarantee to potential 
foreign investors that the host government will pursue efficient economic policies in the 
future (Motta and Norman 1996; Medvedev 2006; Büthe and Milner 2008). On the other 
hand, some studies have advanced the idea that the protection of outward investments may be 
a motivation behind the conclusion of PTAs (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1992; Manger 2009; 
                                                 
3
 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx (January 5, 2012). 
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Hicks and Johnson 2011). Most importantly, Mark Manger (2009) argues that developed 
countries sign PTAs with developing countries for two main reasons. They may try to gain an 
edge over other developed countries by creating discrimination against foreign investments 
from these countries or to re-establish a playing field for their own multinational companies 
after another developed country signed a trade agreement with an emerging economy. Also 
following this line of reasoning, Raymond Hicks and Kris Johnson argue that PTAs with 
investment chapters (what they call “investment-inclusive PTAs”) are a response to demands 
for protection by firms that engage in vertical FDI, that is, firms that fragment the production 
process across countries (Hicks and Johnson 2011).  
Our paper builds on the second of these two strands of literature, without its results 
necessarily being in contradiction with the former. It advances on the state of the art by 
distinguishing two different pathways to investment discrimination. Most importantly, 
however, we derive several testable claims from the argument and expose these propositions 
to systematic, quantitative tests that build on new datasets of dyadic FDI stocks and the 
investment provisions included in PTAs. 
 
Investment Discrimination and the Spread of Trade Agreements 
We develop our argument in two steps: first, we show that PTAs can create investment 
discrimination and second we discuss why and how we expect foreign countries to react to 
this investment discrimination. 
PTAs and Investment Discrimination 
The creation of a PTA can impose costs on third countries through both trade diversion and 
investment discrimination. Trade diversion refers to the substitution of imports from outside 
the PTA with production from inside the PTA (Viner 1950). It occurs when tariff reductions 
inside the PTA make firms located in the PTA more competitive relative to firms from third 
countries. Investment discrimination takes place when investments from outside the trading 
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zone are put at a disadvantage when compared to investments from within the zone. While 
trade diversion has received much scholarly attention (and also the effects of trade diversion 
on the spread of trade agreements),4 investment discrimination has hardly been studied so far.5 
Investment discrimination can be a result of both the tariff differential between PTA 
insiders and outsiders and explicit investment provisions included in trade agreements. First, 
investment discrimination may result from tariff differentials that negatively affect market-
seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI. As various studies have shown, most market-seeking and 
efficiency-seeking FDI is dependent on the importation of intermediate goods (for example, 
Irarrazabal et al. 2010). In this situation, a PTA that reduces the tariffs on imports of 
intermediate goods in a discriminatory manner can cause investment discrimination. This 
effect can best be illustrated by the example of two rivals, one from country A and the other 
from country B, who initially compete on a level playing field in country C. Both have 
production facilities in C to service that market, and both pay the same most-favored-nation 
tariff in importing to C intermediate goods from A and B respectively. Once countries A and 
C conclude a trade agreement that eliminates tariffs on the intermediate imports from A to C, 
however, the competitor from country A gets an edge over the competitor from country B. 
The PTA between countries A and C thus imposes costs on the firm from country B. 
An empirical example is provided by Nippon Steel Corp. from Japan that makes steel 
pipes in India to serve the local car and motorcycle market.6 The trade agreement signed 
between Korea and India in 2009 put Nippon Steel Corp. at a disadvantage because it allowed 
                                                 
4
 See for example Dür 2010; Baccini and Dür 2012. 
5
 This is so because the economics literature is mainly concerned with the opposite effect that sees a trading zone 
attract FDI that would otherwise have gone to third countries, that is, investments moving from a more to a less 
efficient location. 
6
 Daily Yomiuri Online, October 27, 2010. 
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its Korean competitors to import steel plates – an intermediate good needed in the production 
of steel pipes – tariff free from Korea, while Nippon Steel had to pay a 5 percent tariff on its 
imports of steel plates. The India-Japan agreement signed in 2010 re-established a level 
playing field for Nippon Steel by eliminating tariffs on Indian imports from Japan. The same 
agreement also helped Japanese producers of automobiles in India (Suzuki and Toyota) that 
directly compete there with producers from Korea (in particular, Hyundai). In the absence of 
an agreement between India and Japan, Suzuki and Toyota would have had to pay a 12.5 
percent tariff on imports of automotive parts from Japan as compared to a 1 percent tariff for 
Hyundai on imports from Korea (spire 2009: 3). 
Second, investment discrimination may also be the result of the inclusion of explicit 
investment provisions in a trade agreement. An increasing number of PTAs contain 
investment provisions that open up certain sectors of the economy to investors from the 
partner country, but not necessarily from third countries (Lesher and Miroudot 2006; 
Kotschwar 2009; Dür et al. 2013). A trade agreement may provide for preferential treatment 
by guaranteeing national treatment to investors from the partner country, waiving restrictions 
on foreign ownership in strategic sectors in a discriminatory manner, and eliminating 
screening and local content or other performance requirements (such as exporting a certain 
percentage of the production or transferring technology) for companies from the partner 
country. These investment provisions can be incorporated either in a separate investment 
chapter or in a services chapter that refers to commercial presence as a mode of supply for 
services. It is in the services sector that the investment provisions included in PTAs are most 
likely to create discrimination. Much FDI in services is aimed at accessing domestic markets 
(see, for example, Kolstad and Villanger 2008), and thus particularly vulnerable for 
investment discrimination. Moreover, often the right of establishment in sectors such as 
telecommunications, energy and water supply, and financial services is highly circumscribed 
8 
 
in domestic legislation (Hoekman 2006), whereas FDI in the manufacturing sector is 
generally not only allowed, but even invited.7 
The Australia-U.S. free trade agreement (AUSFTA) offers an illustration of the many 
ways by which investment provisions in regional trade agreements can create discrimination 
(Westcott 2007). Foreign companies investing in Australia have to undergo government 
screening if the investment exceeds certain thresholds. AUSFTA either completely abolished 
these thresholds for U.S. companies (for greenfield investments) or increased them to a level 
that ensures that most investments can be made without government screening (for 
acquisitions in non-sensitive sectors). Not having to undergo government screening provides 
U.S. companies with an important advantage because screening implies a costly delay in 
investments and because in many cases the government imposes conditions on investments 
that underwent screening. Relying on a very different, but still discriminatory approach, the 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between India and Korea (2010) grants 
South Korean banks “favorable consideration” when applying for the establishment of 
branches in India. 
The example of NAFTA shows how the two pathways to investment discrimination 
play out in practice. After entry into force of NAFTA, European investors in Mexico suffered 
from discrimination because they had to pay tariffs when importing intermediate products into 
                                                 
7
 Importantly, the extent to which investment and service provisions in PTAs discriminate against third country 
firms depends on the rules of origin included in these agreements (Mattoo and Sauvé 2007, 251-52). The Closer 
Economic Partnership Agreement between Hong Kong and Mainland China (2003), for example, includes rules 
of origin for services and investments that limits the agreement’s benefits to suppliers that “engage in substantive 
business operations in Hong Kong”, which among other things is measured by the percentage of local residents 
in the company’s staff. By contrast, the Australia-Singapore agreement (2003) follows a rather liberal approach 
to rules of origin for services and investments by extending benefits to enterprises established in a party and 
natural persons that have the right of permanent residence in a party. 
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Mexico. These tariffs even increased after the entry into force of NAFTA, putting European 
companies in Mexico (for example, Volkswagen in the automobile sector) at a disadvantage 
as compared to American producers (Dür 2007). NAFTA also contains detailed investment 
provisions. These can be found in a separate investment chapter (Chapter 11), Appendix 300-
A on trade and investment in the automotive sector, and other chapters such as those on 
telecommunications (Chapter 13) and financial services (Chapter 14). Until the European 
Union’s (EU) PTA with Mexico entered into force in 2000 (the goods part) and 2001 
(services and investments), several of these provisions made it easier for U.S. companies to 
expand their investments in Mexico (Manger 2009).8 For example, NAFTA grants national 
treatment to investors from all parties and prohibits performance requirements. Chapter 14 
gives an advantage to American investors by allowing them to establish financial institutions 
in Mexico, even if the impact of this provision was eased by liberal rules of origin (Mattoo 
and Sauvé 2007, 251-52). It is not astonishing given this discussion that in the aftermath of 
the entry into force of NAFTA U.S. and Canadian FDI stocks in Mexico rose much more 
rapidly than FDI stocks from other countries (Lesher and Miroudot 2006, 32). 
Investment discrimination, however, may not necessarily lead to a reduction in 
aggregate investments from a third country in the preferential trading zone. In fact, investment 
discrimination may require a company to increase investments within the trading zone, for 
example to comply with rules of origin or to avoid paying high tariffs on inputs. The 
discrimination stems from the fact that in this process the company has to incur costs. 
Moreover, a third country’s aggregate FDI stocks in the preferential trading area may increase 
                                                 
8
 The EU-Mexico PTA only partly addressed the investment discrimination emanating from NAFTA, however, 
because before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the EU did not have exclusive competence to 
negotiate on FDI. Around the same time, therefore, several EU member countries signed Investment Promotion 
and Protection Agreements with Mexico that served the purpose of responding to FDI discrimination. 
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because of tariff jumping investments by companies that previously exported goods and 
services into this area or the attractions caused by a larger (and potentially more dynamic) 
market (Blomström et al. 2000). We thus expect that while investment discrimination may not 
necessarily affect the volume of FDI, it has an impact on firms’ markup.9 The argument that 
we set out then is also compatible with studies that suggest that at least some preferential 
trade areas have attracted FDI from third countries (see, for example, Büthe and Milner 2008). 
 
Foreign Countries’ Reaction to Investment Discrimination 
The creation of a PTA thus is likely to impose costs on third-country companies with 
investments inside the new trading zone. Even if the costs from FDI discrimination are not 
particularly large for an individual company, they are likely to exceed the costs from lobbying 
for firms with established access to decision-makers. We thus expect these companies to 
respond to the discrimination by increasing their lobbying effort and asking governments for 
help to re-establish a “level playing field”.10 Governments should be responsive to this 
lobbying because business support is important for them in several ways.11 First, supportive 
                                                 
9
 Anecdotal evidence supports this argument. Many European companies with investments in Mexico, for 
example, expected that NAFTA would undermine their competitiveness (Sanahuja 2000, 47). Similarly, Manger 
(2009, 146) mentions Toyota’s concerns “that its investment plans in Mexico could become unprofitable” as a 
result of NAFTA.  
10
 Alternatively, one could expect companies simply shifting their investments to a different country or making 
other adjustments. Doing so, however, may be costly in the case of efficiency-seeking FDI and counter-
productive in the case of market-seeking FDI. 
11
 Although we use election terminology in this reasoning, the argument applies to both democracies and 
autocracies. Evidently, the selectorate size differs between the two ideal types of political system (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003), but in both political systems governments want to stay in power and for that reason have 
an incentive to avoid creating business opposition. 
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business actors may share information with government actors that is essential for the 
formulation and implementation of policies (Wright 1996; Hall and Deardorff 2006). Such 
information may include information on market conditions, expected policy results and the 
amount of support or opposition to a policy. Second, supportive business may back the 
government in an election campaign, whereas non-supportive business is more likely to assist 
the opposition (Fordham and McKeown 2003). Assistance can be given in form of campaign 
contributions and information that helps the reelection effort. Finally, the ability to delay 
investments or relocate production facilities endows business with structural power 
(Lindblom 1977). Since such investment decisions impact on a country’s economic growth 
and the economy influences election outcomes, governments have an incentive to ensure that 
business refrains from using its structural power. 
The lobbying by outward investors that are put at a disadvantage in third markets 
hence should make governments pursue policies in support of these investors. Several 
examples from different regions of the world are evidence of the plausibility of this argument. 
The proposal by the European Commission for the EU’s 2020 strategy, for example, stresses 
that re-establishing or maintaining a “level playing field vis-à-vis our external competitors 
should be a key goal” in international trade negotiations (European Commission 2010, 23). 
Canada’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Trade explicitly states that free trade 
agreements are designed to “help level the playing field for Canada vis-à-vis competitors that 
have agreements with markets of interest and also help to secure Canadian investments” 
(Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009). The same report argues that Canada’s 
negotiations for PTAs with the Central American countries, the Dominican Republic, Jordan, 
Korea, Morocco, and Panama are motivated by fear of discrimination, as existing PTAs put 
“Canadian businesses at a disadvantage.” Similarly, Taiwan shows itself extremely concerned 
about the spread of PTAs especially in East Asia and the resulting threat of “marginalization” 
for Taiwanese business (Taiwan Bureau of Foreign Trade 2009). 
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Governments’ policy of choice to respond to investment discrimination often is to sign 
a trade agreement with the member country of a PTA where domestic firms face 
discrimination. A PTA is preferable to a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) in this situation as 
only the former can offset the investment discrimination from the initial agreement by 
eliminating tariffs on intermediate goods, whereas BITs do not envisage tariff reductions. 
Moreover, the investment provisions included in BITs tend to be less far-reaching than those 
contained in PTAs.12 BITs mainly comprise provisions that protect investments, for example 
by guaranteeing compensation in cases of expropriation and the repatriation of profits. Few 
BITs, by contrast, include provisions that liberalize foreign investors’ access to a market.13 
Only a new PTA that includes explicit investment provisions can thus re-establish a level 
playing field with respect to the admission, operation, and protection of foreign investments. 
Obviously, signing such an agreement is not costless, as lower tariffs and better conditions for 
foreign multinational companies may hurt domestic import-competing firms. It is only when 
the pressure from exporters and internationally active firms outweighs these protectionist 
demands that a government will sign a trade agreement. 
Summarizing this reasoning, our expectation is that a country’s desire to sign a PTA 
with another country increases, the larger the investment discrimination that it faces in the 
other country’s market. A trade agreement, however, can only be signed if at least two 
countries agree on its desirability; that is, one or more potential partner countries also need an 
incentive to sign the agreement. Our argument is that the probability of a PTA is highest, 
                                                 
12
 Kotschwar 2009, 375, for example, writes that “many RTA [regional trade agreement] provisions have been 
used to expand and to correct perceived deficiencies in BITs, often aiming for greater liberalization.” The 
findings reported in Lesher and Miroudot 2006 also support this statement. 
13
 Only the United States, Canada, and recently Japan have signed “liberalizing BITs”, according to UNCTAD 
2009a, 20.  
13 
 
when both partners face investment discrimination in each other’s market. If only one country 
is concerned about investment discrimination in the other, then an agreement may still be 
possible if the former offers side-payments to the latter. Nevertheless, we consider the 
chances of an agreement in such a constellation less likely than in a situation in which both 
sides face at least some investment discrimination, as agreeing on side-payments tends to be 
difficult in the face of transaction costs and difficulties in the enforcement of such 
agreements. In form of a hypothesis, we expect that the likelihood of countries A and B 
signing a PTA increases, as both the investment discrimination that A faces in B and the 
investment discrimination that B faces in A increase. We should thus see a spread of trade 
agreements, with the amount of investment discrimination influencing the sequence in which 
dyads sign trade agreements.  
 
A Spatial Econometric Test of the Argument 
We test our argument quantitatively on a database including 166 countries for a time period of 
18 years (1990-2007). The database includes all major countries for which data are available 
for the period under analysis (see the list of countries in the online appendix). We start our 
analysis in 1990, first, because the eighteen year period covered fully encompasses the most 
recent wave of regionalism. By contrast, only a small number of agreements were signed in 
the 1970s and 1980s. By extending our analysis to a period in which few agreements predict 
few agreements, we would bias the analysis in favor of our argument. Second, the availability 
and quality of FDI data is much worse for the time before 1990. Since our analysis starts in 
1990, we drop country pairs from our analysis that already had a working trade agreement 
between them as of 1989. This is a result of our decision to only focus on the first agreement 
signed by a dyad (see below); dyads that already have a trade agreement between them as of 
1989 (such as Australia and New Zealand or France and Germany) by definition cannot sign a 
new agreement in the 1990s or 2000s. 
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Our dataset on whether or not a dyad signed a trade agreement in a specific year 
encompasses 247 preferential trade agreements that were signed between 1990 and 2007 (this 
excludes agreements that either deepen or replace an existing agreement between two 
countries), of which 159 are bilateral ones (Baccini and Dür 2012). The 247 agreements 
translate into the number of 1,878 pairs of countries (out of 13,451 undirected dyads 
considered, so 14 percent) that signed a first PTA between 1990 and 2007. Opting for the year 
of signature rather than the year of entry into force of an agreement makes sense as it is in this 
moment that we expect firms in third countries to start worrying about the expected negative 
consequences for them.14 
In only considering the first agreement between two countries, we omit the periodic 
treaty changes that have deepened integration in the EU, such as the Treaty of Maastricht 
(1991) that introduced European Economic and Monetary Union. Moreover, we exclude a 
substantial number of second and third-generation agreements among the countries that 
became independent after the Soviet Union dissolved (such as the 1999 Common Economic 
Zone or the 2003 free trade agreement between Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation 
and Ukraine). Including these second and third agreements would be problematic for two 
reasons. First, it is difficult to establish a reliable list of agreements that deepened integration 
between two countries. Many of the agreements that we consider in our analysis have been 
revised at least once. For example, the agreement between Chile and Mercosur, signed in 
1996, has been revised 53 times (as of late 2011).15 Which of these revisions should be 
considered far-reaching enough to be included in the database? Second, it seems plausible that 
                                                 
14
 In fact, the difference between the date of signature and the date of entry into force is relatively small: using 
215 agreements listed on the webpage of the World Trade Organization (as of May 2010), we calculated a mean 
difference of 453 days between the date of signature and the date of entry into force. 
15
 See http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/msch/protocolos_s.asp (March 20, 2013).  
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both revisions of an existing agreement and a new agreement replacing an existing one may 
follow a logic that is different from the logic of signing a first agreement. 
To empirically capture our argument about the external impact of PTAs, we need to 
measure the potential for an agreement to discriminate against FDI from third countries. 
According to our argument, this potential is mainly an effect of the presence or absence of a 
PTA and the strength of FDI links between countries. In particular, country A’s investments 
in country B will be threatened by an agreement between countries B and C (D, E,…) if a.) 
country B is a major host of foreign investments, b.) for country A outward stocks of 
investments are important, and c.) country C is a large exporter of FDI. Items a.) and b.) are 
important to establish that A and B have an interest in each other’s markets and thus in each 
other’s trade policy. Item c.) captures the amount of threat that emanates from a specific 
agreement for the investment relationship between A and B. 
Building on these ideas, we calculate a vector of spatial weights (that is, a measure of 
the strength of the effect of a policy change in one unit on all other units) using the following 
equation:  
∑








∗∗=
,...,
D,...B_C,PTA*D,...C,FDI_out
BGDP
BFDI_in
AGDP
AFDI_out
DCAB
w  (1) 
where the subscripts A, B and so on denote countries, w  is the weight for a directed dyad, 
FDI_out the outward stocks of FDI and FDI_in the inward stocks of FDI.16 
The term PTA is a dummy variable that captures whether a dyad signed a trade 
agreement between t-1 and t-5. Ideally, we would use a measure of the margin of preference 
for member countries (that is, the difference between most-favored-nation treatment and the 
treatment for members of the PTA) with respect to tariffs and investment provisions rather 
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 Below we show that the results do not change if we split the two components of our spatial term and estimate 
them using an interaction term, as suggested by Neumayer and Plümper (2012). 
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than a dummy variable in this equation. Unfortunately, the data that would be necessary to 
calculate this measure are not available and would be very difficult to collect. We partly 
compensate for this limitation by presenting and testing three corollaries of the argument 
below. Only considering agreements that were signed between t-1 and t-5 years makes sense 
for two reasons: on the one hand, lagging by one year helps us avoid simultaneity bias. On the 
other hand, it seems plausible that after some time companies that are not successful in getting 
a political solution will adapt to the new competitive situation. With their lobbying effort 
declining, governments “forget” about the issue. We check the robustness of our 5-year hunch 
in the empirical analysis below by running models with 3-year and 7-year cutoff points. 
We divide the FDI inward and outward stocks of countries A and B by their respective 
GDP as we are interested in a measure of the importance of FDI outward and inward stocks 
relative to the size of the economy.17 By contrast, we take the actual value for the outward 
FDI stocks of country C, as it clearly makes a difference for A if C is a large economy such as 
the U.S. or a smaller one such as Australia. In 2008, Australia and the U.S. had outward FDI 
stocks amounting to 19 percent and 22 percent of GDP, respectively. While these two values 
are very similar, in absolute terms the outward stocks of the U.S. were 16 times higher than 
those of Australia ($3,162 billion as compared to $195 billion).18  
The spatial weight for the directed dyad BA is calculated equivalently:  
                                                 
17
 The data are from UNCTAD 2010. The data only capture long-term foreign investments where the investor 
has the intention of exercising influence over the management of a company. Short-term investments in stock or 
money markets thus do not distort the data. We use FDI stocks rather than flows because the latter are subject to 
exogenous short-term fluctuations and because endogeneity (that is, the signing of a PTA having an effect on 
FDI) is a more severe problem when using flows rather than stocks. 
18
 Data from http://unctadstat.unctad.org/. 
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We then calculate the undirected weights as follows:  
)ln(AB BAwABww +=  (3) 
The reasoning here is that an agreement between two countries is most likely if both countries 
face investment discrimination, that is, both 
AB
w  and 
BA
w  are high. An agreement, 
however, may also be possible if only one of these two terms is high, as the country that faces 
large investment discrimination would offer concessions to the other country to reach an 
agreement. We take the natural logarithm of the resulting value to deal with outliers. Below, 
we check the robustness of our findings by also running the analysis with the smaller of the 
two values for 
AB
w  and 
BA
w  as the value for the undirected dyad. 
An example illustrates our approach. In 2003, the ratio between FDI outward stocks 
and GDP was 0.15 for the US and the ratio of FDI inward stocks and GDP was 0.63 for Chile. 
We calculate the pressure for the US to sign an agreement with Chile in 2003 as 0.15 times 
0.63 times the outward FDI stocks of the countries with which Chile had signed an agreement 
between 1998 and 2002 (between t-1 and t-5). Concretely, Chile had signed agreements with 
Mexico and Peru in 1998, the Central American countries in 1999, and the EU in 2002. The 
expectation is that a PTA between Chile and the US is more likely in response to a PTA 
between Chile and the EU than in response to a PTA between Chile and Mexico, because the 
EU is a much larger exporter of FDI than Mexico. In adding this second component we 
capture an extra-dyadic relation between the US-Chile pair and the other countries in the 
dataset. The sum of these products amounts to the spatial weight for the directed dyad US-
Chile (in this case, 984,000). We then calculate the spatial weight for the directed dyad Chile-
US (1.96). The natural logarithm of the sum of the two values for the directed dyads is the 
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value of our variable FDI Discrimination (13.80). Figures 2a-d show how this variable 
changes over time for a series of countries. 
 
FIGURES 2A-D ABOUT HERE 
 
We cross-check our results with dyadic FDI data (that is, country A’s FDI stocks in 
country B, country C’s FDI stocks in country B, and so on). Unfortunately, the available 
dyadic data for outward and inward stocks of FDI are not very reliable for the number of 
countries and years that we are interested in. Even for the member countries of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data are sketchy (OECD 
2010). For example, for the directed dyad Australia-Germany (two large and highly 
developed economies, for which data quality should be relatively high) outward stocks are 
missing for seven of the eighteen years from 1990 to 2007. The data are even worse for stocks 
in developing countries, explaining why the OECD classifies about 20 percent of Australia’s 
outward FDI as unallocated. 
In view of these difficulties, we created a new dataset on dyadic FDI stocks relying on 
UNCTAD data (UNCTAD 2010a). Since the outward stocks of country A in country B 
should be equal to the inward stocks of country B from country A, we merged the inward and 
outward stocks of countries with the purpose of having dyadic FDI data for as many country-
dyads as possible. We also added data from the UNCTAD country reports to the data made 
available by UNCTAD’s extraction service whenever we encountered missing values.19 In 
doing so, we managed to double the number of dyads with non-missing observations as 
compared to the dataset provided by UNCTAD. Of all dyad years included in our dataset 
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 The UNCTAD country reports are available at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1 (last accessed May 15, 2011). 
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(239,119), 9 percent have a directed FDI value that is different from 0. Although the resulting 
data are far from ideal, with still a large number of missing values and occasional jumps in 
time series, they are an improvement compared to existing datasets. Below, we show that our 
results do not change when using this dataset. 
In line with other studies in the field, we use a probit model to assess our argument 
(for example, Egger and Larch 2008; Mansfield and Milner 2012).20 Our model includes a 
spatial lag to capture the FDI discrimination effect and control variables for both the dyad 
under consideration and potential external shocks.21 Following Neumayer and Plümper’s 
(2010) notation, we estimate the following equation: 
yij,t = α + ρwij,t-1 * ŷij,t-5 + βxij,t-1 + εij,t (4) 
 
where yij,t indicates whether the undirected dyad encompassing countries i and j signed a trade 
agreement at time t, wij,t-1 is the connectivity matrix as described above, ŷij,t-5 is the lagged 
dependent variable, which scores one if countries i and j formed a PTA over the previous five 
years, and wij,t-1 * ŷij,t-5 is the resulting spatial term.22 Moreover, xij,t-1 are the values for the 
                                                 
20
 Below we show that the results do not change when relying on a Cox proportional hazard model (Table A8 in 
the Appendix). In fact, our probit model with cubic polynomials is virtually the same as a survival model (Beck 
et al. 1998). We opted for the former method in our main analysis because a.) doing so allows us to compare our 
results to those from previous studies on the formation of PTAs, which also used probit models (for example, 
Mansfield and Milner 2012); b.) contrary to the Cox model, a probit model does not rely on the proportional 
hazard assumption; and c.) a probit model makes the interpretation of the interaction term, which is tricky in 
non-linear models, more straightforward than in the case of the Cox model. 
21
 We calculated the Moran index, using the total number of agreements signed by each country, to check 
whether the inclusion of a spatial lag is appropriate (Ward and Gleditsch 2008). The result confirms that there is 
statistically significant spatial correlation among countries. 
22
 Neumayer and Plümper (2010: 158) note that “by using ŷ rather than y in the spatial dependence variable, this 
is not strictly speaking a spatial lag model.” 
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undirected dyad ij of a set of control variables that are lagged by a year to avoid 
contemporaneous correlation. Finally, ρ is the spatial autoregression parameter that gives the 
impact of the spatial term on the outcome variable, β is a coefficient, α is the constant, and εij,t  
is the error term. For the significance tests, we rely on Huber-White standard errors that can 
take account of possible heteroskedasticity or intra-group correlation of the data (Beck 2008). 
The clustering of these standard errors by dyad, and the use of cubic polynomials as suggested 
by Carter and Signorino (2010), allow us to account for time dependence. As a robustness 
check for this decision, we also employ bootstrap standard errors (see Table A9 in the 
Appendix). 
The control variables that we include in the models capture important characteristics 
of the two countries that form a dyad and the context in which a dyad considers concluding an 
agreement.23 Several of them are logged to deal with occasional high values in the data. For 
monadic variables, we use the smaller of the two values for the two countries as value for the 
dyad. The variables that capture the economic condition are the degree to which the two 
countries are involved in international capital flows (FDI/GDP, measured as the smaller of 
the two countries’ outward stocks of FDI divided by GDP), the amount of trade between them 
(Trade), the size of the two economies (GDP), the per capita GDP (GDPpc), and economic 
growth (GDP Growth). We expect greater international capital flows and trade, and larger 
economies, to be associated with a higher probability of a dyad signing an agreement. The 
expected effects of GDPpc and GDP Growth are ambiguous. Furthermore, we include a 
dichotomous variable that is coded one for dyads that had an investment treaty between them 
in the year prior to the one under analysis in the model (BIT). The effect of this variable could 
go in both ways: it could reduce the threat of investment discrimination and thus lower the 
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 Univariate summary statistics and data sources for all of these variables are available in the online appendix. 
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probability of two countries signing a trade agreement (but see our discussion above) or signal 
large outward stocks of FDI and thus large potential for investment discrimination. 
With respect to domestic and international political conditions, we include a dummy 
variable for military allies (Alliance) and a democracy score (Democracy, with data from 
Freedom House 2007).24 The expectation is for military allies and democracies to show a 
higher propensity to sign trade agreements. The control variables that capture the geographic 
position of the two countries are contiguity (Contiguity, scoring one if two countries share a 
common border), distance (Distance, we use the natural logarithm of this variable), and island 
country (Island, scoring one if both countries are islands). Larger distance and geographic 
position as an island should decrease the likelihood of a trade agreement, whereas contiguity 
should increase it. Three control variables account for the position of the countries in, and the 
general state of, the international trading system: WTO membership (WTO), an ongoing 
WTO-sponsored multilateral trade negotiation (WTO Round, scoring one from 1990 through 
1993 and from 2001 onwards), and whether the two countries had a trade dispute between 
them (Trade Dispute). Our expectations are for WTO membership and WTO negotiations to 
augment the chances of an agreement, and trade disputes between the two countries to reduce 
those chances. We also include three variables that capture the cultural distance between the 
two countries, namely earlier colonial relationship (Colony), common language (Language) 
and common religion (Religion), with the expectation that cultural proximity should 
positively influence the probability of two countries signing a PTA. Finally, we include the 
log of the number of PTAs that the two countries have signed with third countries prior to 
time t (PTA Count), with the aim of controlling for potential endogeneity resulting from the 
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 The results reported below do not change when using other data sources, such as the Polity IV score (Marshall 
and Jaggers 2008). 
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inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable in our model (Plümper 
and Neumayer 2010). 
 
Findings 
The findings are very supportive of our argument. In our main model, the variable capturing 
the effect of investment discrimination is strongly statistically significant and has the right 
sign (see Model 1 in Table 1). Our variable of interest also has a sizeable substantive effect. A 
move from the smallest to the largest value on FDI Discrimination increases the number of 
dyads signing a PTA each year by 45 [20, 73].25 When looking at the effect of a change from 
the mean minus a standard deviation to the mean plus a standard deviation the effect is still an 
additional 17 [8, 26] dyads that conclude a PTA each year. That this effect is large is 
illustrated by a comparison to the effect of Trade: a move on this variable from the mean 
minus to the mean plus a standard deviation only increases the number of dyads signing a 
PTA by 10 [3, 17]. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Most control variables behave as expected. Country pairs with strong trade links and 
large economies are more likely to sign a trade agreement. Agreements are also more likely to 
be signed by countries experiencing slow economic growth. Dyads that have already signed a 
BIT, form part of the same alliance, and have democratic political institutions are more likely 
to conclude a trade agreement. Among the variables capturing geography, only the 
statistically significant negative coefficient for contiguity is counter-intuitive, but may be 
explained by the fact that several neighboring countries already signed trade agreements 
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 Throughout the numbers in brackets give the 95 per cent confidence intervals. 
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between them before 1990 (and these dyads are excluded from our analysis). The various 
variables that operationalize the effect of the international trading system have the expected 
sign. Also the three variables measuring cultural distance are positive and statistically 
significant. Finally, the coefficient for PTA Count is negative and statistically significant. The 
online appendix provides additional information on the fit of the model. 
In a second model, we operationalize FDI Discrimination using dyadic FDI data. For 
this analysis we calculated the spatial weights as shown in equations 1 to 3 with the difference 
that FDI_out and FDI_in refer to the stocks of country A (B,...) in country B (C,...). The 
findings of this model again provide clear-cut support for our argument (see Model 2 in Table 
1). The effect of the spatial weight term remains positive and statistically significant. The 
control variables also are remarkably similar to those reported for Model 1. According to this 
model, a move from a low to a high value on FDI Discrimination (mean minus/plus a 
standard deviation) increases the number of dyads signing a PTA by 83 [23, 163]. The model 
with dyadic stocks of FDI thus predicts a significantly larger effect of investment 
discrimination than the model with monadic FDI data. This result is encouraging as the 
operationalization of the dyadic model more closely approximates our theory than the one of 
the monadic model. 
In the following, to further assess the empirical validity of our argument, we test three 
additional implications that we derive from our argument. They relate to the two pathways to 
investment discrimination that we discussed above, namely tariff differentials on intermediate 
products and provisions that relax investment rules for the parties to the agreement.  
 
Trade in Intermediate Goods and the Spread of PTAs 
A first implication of our model is that the FDI discrimination effect should be larger, the 
more two countries trade in intermediate goods (Corollary 1). This argument derives from our 
first pathway to investment discrimination discussed above, namely FDI discrimination that 
24 
 
results from tariff differentials that negatively affect market-seeking and efficiency-seeking 
FDI. To test this argument, we add to the model an interaction term between FDI 
discrimination and a variable capturing the amount of trade in intermediate goods between the 
two countries (Intermediate). We used the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification 
of the United Nations (2002) to distinguish such trade.26 The results of this model again are 
very supportive (see Model 3 in Table 1). The coefficient for the interaction term is positive 
and statistically significant. What is more, the effect is substantively important as shown in 
Figure 3. As expected, the marginal effect of FDI Discrimination increases as trade in 
intermediate goods increases. 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Investment Chapters and the Spread of PTAs 
Our argument also implies that agreements with substantive rules concerning foreign 
investments create greater pressure for excluded countries to sign a PTA than other 
agreements (Corollary 2). This is so because narrow agreements that do not contain explicit 
rules on investments can create investment discrimination only via intermediate tariffs, 
whereas broad agreements produce discrimination through both tariffs and discriminatory 
investment provisions. We further expect that investment discrimination that is caused by 
investment provisions in trade agreements should motivate states to sign new trade 
agreements that also include investment provisions (Corollary 3). The reasoning here is that 
only explicit investment rules can protect foreign investments against the discrimination 
emanating from investment provisions. For example, we expect countries that suffered from 
investment discrimination owing to the North American Free Trade Agreement (which 
                                                 
26
 The online appendix provides more detail on this variable. 
25 
 
contained substantive FDI provisions) to sign PTAs with Mexico that include investment 
chapters, as did Costa Rica (1994) and Chile (1998). 
We rely on a new dataset on the design of a large number of preferential trade 
agreements to test these corollaries (Dür et al. 2013). This dataset allows us to distinguish 
between agreements with and without substantive investment provisions. A substantive 
provision can be a national treatment or a most favored nation clause. Such provisions may be 
found in the services chapter of a PTA or a separate, NAFTA-type investment chapter. 
Among the agreements that have substantive provisions are NAFTA, the U.S. agreements 
with Korea and Panama, the EU agreements with Chile and Mexico, several agreements 
negotiated by the European Free Trade Association, most of the agreements concluded by 
Japan, and the agreements signed by New Zealand with Singapore and Thailand. Of the 1,878 
dyads that signed a first agreement in the period under analysis, 312 (17 percent) committed 
themselves to substantive investment provisions.27 
Based on these data, we calculated a spatial term as shown in equations 1 and 2 above 
in which we replace PTAA_C, D,... and PTAB_C, D,... with variables that are coded one for dyads 
with substantive investment provisions and zero for all others (FDI Discrimination chapter). 
We then ran Model 1 with first all PTAs (Corollary 2) and then only PTAs with investment 
chapters as dependent variables (Corollary 3). The resulting models offer support for our 
argument (Models 4 and 5 in Table 1). The spatial term is positive and statistically significant 
at least at the 95 per cent level in both models. 
Even more interesting given our argument is whether PTAs with investment chapter 
have a larger substantive effect than PTAs without investment chapter. To answer this 
question, we also calculated a spatial term for agreements without FDI provisions (FDI 
Discrimination no chapter) and then compared the substantive effects of FDI Discrimination 
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 The online appendix provides more information on these data. 
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chapter and FDI Discrimination no chapter. The results are encouraging. In Model 4, 
changing FDI Discrimination chapter from the mean minus a standard deviation to the mean 
plus a standard deviation increases the expected number of dyads signing a PTA by 8 [1, 16]. 
By contrast, an equivalent change in the variable FDI Discrimination no chapter increases the 
predicted number of PTAs by 16 [8, 26]. At first sight, therefore, the effect of the latter 
variable is larger than the effect of the former. Nevertheless, these numbers have to be 
assessed in light of the number of agreements that enter the equation on the right-hand side. 
From this perspective, a mere 312 dyads with investment chapters result in an additional 8 
PTAs, whereas the remaining 1,566 dyads without investment chapter produce an additional 
16 PTAs. Agreements with investment chapters thus have a stronger effect than agreements 
without. The result is even more clear-cut for the models with investment chapter as 
dependent variable. Here, an equivalent change in FDI Discrimination chapter increases the 
predicted number of dyads signing a PTA with investment chapter by 16 [11, 22], whereas 
(and this effect is only weakly statistically significant) the substantially larger number of 
agreements entering into FDI Discrimination no chapter only leads to an increase of 3 [0, 7] 
agreements. In short, the data support all three corollaries. Overall, Models 1 to 5 have offered 
significant support for the argument linking investment discrimination to the formation of 
PTAs. 
 
Robustness checks 
We have carried out a large number of checks to gauge the robustness of our findings.28  
 
Endogeneity 
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 These tests produce substantially the same results when using dyadic FDI data. For lack of comparable data, 
however, we could not implement an instrumental variable analysis with dyadic FDI data. 
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First, we control for endogeneity in our model, that is, the imminent signature of a PTA 
stimulating an increase in FDI stocks. We instrument our spatial variables, following advice 
by Franzese and Hays (2008). In a regression without spatial term a good instrument z should 
be correlated with the variable to endogenize (in our case, this would be Wŷ), but not with the 
error term of the main model (Murray 2006). Under the condition of cross-spatial 
endogeneity, the requirement is for zj not to affect yi. If the exogeneity condition of z is not 
met, the cross-spatial estimation might perform worse than a regular estimation (Franzese and 
Hays 2008). An ideal candidate for instrumenting Wyi is Wxi, where xi is a non-spatial 
regressor (Franzese and Hays 2008: 759). To achieve this, we first use a spatial term that 
includes FDI stocks lagged by ten years in the connectivity matrix as instrumental variable. 
FDI stocks at time t-10 are good predictors of FDI at time t (the correlation is 0.6), but are 
weakly correlated with the error term (the correlation is 0.1), and thus are good instruments to 
deal with potential endogeneity. Moreover, they are logically exogenous to the causal link we 
are interested in, namely the formation of a PTA ten years later.29 
Second, we instrument our spatial variables by Alliance weighted by the connectivity 
matrix discussed above, as Alliance is a good predictor of the formation of PTAs.30 In the case 
of three countries, Germany, Ghana, and the United Kingdom, FDI Discrimination between 
Germany and Ghana is instrumented by Alliance between Germany and Ghana. There is no 
evidence to believe that Germany and Ghana’s Alliance has any effect on the United 
Kingdom’s probability of forming a PTA with either Germany or Ghana outside the causal 
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 Baccini and Urpelainen (2012) show that negotiations of north-south PTAs last less than three years on 
average. Building on work by Jensen 2003, we also checked whether adding data from the human development 
index and natural resources as instruments in the first stage made a difference, but results are very similar. 
30
 We obtain similar results if we use Colony weighted by the connectivity matrix as instrument. We are unable 
to include both Alliance and Colony weighted by the connectivity matrix because they are highly correlated. 
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channel of FDI discrimination and after controlling for the presence of Alliance between 
Germany and the United Kingdom and Ghana and the United Kingdom. Hence, this approach 
satisfies the main conditions for instrumenting spatial variables.31 
Various tests confirm the validity of the instrument. In particular, the 
underidentification test (Anderson canonical test) leads us to reject the null hypothesis that 
models are underidentified, whereas both the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic and the Stock 
and Yogo test lead us to reject the null hypothesis that the equations are weakly identified 
(Stock and Yogo 2002).32 To implement the two-stage estimation, we first regress FDI 
diversion on FDI stocks lagged by 10 years and Alliance weighted by FDI Discrimination.33 
Second, we obtain the predicted values from these regressions and place them on the right-
hand side of our model. Finally, we estimate again our main models with bootstrapped 
standard error (100 replications) to reduce correlation between the first stage and second 
stage. 
The findings from the second stage of the instrumental variable model again support 
our argument (Model A1 in Table A5). The coefficient for investment discrimination is 
positive and statistically significant, while all other coefficients are similar to those reported 
for the other models. Importantly, the residuals from the first stage are not statistically 
significant in the second stage, confirming the validity of our instrument. As expected, the 
substantive effect that we predict based on this model is slightly smaller than for Model 1. 
Nevertheless, a move from a low to a high value on the FDI discrimination variable (mean 
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 The correlation between FDI Discrimination and Alliance weighted by the connectivity matrix is 0.4, whereas 
the correlation between Alliance weighted by the connectivity matrix and the Cox-Snell residuals of Model 1 is 
0. 
32
 These tests are carried out using IVREG2 in Stata 12. 
33
 We note that both instruments are always statistically significant at the convectional level in the first stage of 
the regression. 
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minus/plus a standard deviation) still increases the expected number of dyads signing a PTA 
per year by 16 [7, 24]. This indicates that our causal mechanism has substantial explanatory 
power even after controlling for endogeneity. 
 
Other Operationalizalizations of the Spatial Term 
Second, following Neumayer and Plümper (2012), we split the main explanatory variable into 
two parts, one capturing the number of agreements signed with third countries and the FDI 
outward stocks of these third countries (FDI Discrimination I) and the other the outward and 
inward stocks of countries A and B respectively (FDI Discrimination II). We then interact 
these two terms in the model that we estimate. The advantage of doing so is that we can 
separately assess the impact of the various terms that enter the calculation of FDI 
Discrimination. As expected, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant (see Model A2). In the appendix, we show graphically that the 
marginal effect of FDI Discrimination I turns positive as FDI Discrimination II increases (see 
Figure A3). Again, this result supports our argument. 
Third, we test whether PTAs are actually signed as a result of competition over inward 
stocks rather than to protect FDI outward stocks. Country A (an FDI importer) may value 
existing FDI inward stocks (for example, because of the tax income created by foreign 
investments) and fear that a PTA between country B (an FDI exporter) and country C (an FDI 
importer) could divert FDI stocks towards country C. Country A may then use a PTA with 
country B to protect its existing FDI inward stocks. We calculate the corresponding spatial 
weight for the directed dyad AB in line with equation 1 above, but replace 
D,...C,FDI_out with D,...C,FDI_in . Here country A is not concerned about an agreement 
between B and a capital exporter but about one that includes B and a capital importer. We 
again take the sum of the two values for the directed dyads AB and BA as shown in equation 
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3. The evidence does not support this line of argument, however. The coefficient on the 
spatial term for attracting FDI is not statistically significant (Model A3). PTAs thus are an 
instrument that countries use to protect their outward stocks of FDI, rather than to compete for 
inward stocks of FDI. 
 
Other Model Specifications 
Furthermore, we include year (Model A4 in the online appendix) and region (Model A5) fixed 
effects. Moreover, we treat the EU as a single actor (by taking the median spatial weight 
across all member countries as weight for the EU, see Models A6-A8). We also use the 
smaller of the two directed dyad values for the undirected dyad rather than taking the sum 
(Model A9) and vary the cut-off point to three (Model A10) and seven years (Model A11) 
respectively. We also include measures of spatial distance (spatial distance and spatial 
distance2) in line with Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012) to capture other diffusion effects, 
including ones deriving from trade diversion (Model A12). Lastly, following advice by Achen 
(2005), we estimate a model with only three covariates (Model A13). For all of these 
alternative specifications, the results are very similar. Most importantly, the coefficient for the 
investment discrimination variable is positive and strongly statistically significant in all of 
these models. In short, our findings are very robust to a variety of changes in 
operationalization and specification. 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that the growth in FDI has had important consequences for international 
economic cooperation. By creating fear of investment discrimination, it has contributed to the 
new regionalism. Countries react to the PTAs signed by other countries to protect the outward 
investments of domestic companies. This reaction contributes to the spread of bilateral and 
regional trade agreements. A quantitative test of this argument has provided robust support for 
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our argument. The evidence has also supported our argument’s implication that dyads with a 
large share of trade in intermediate goods face greater pressure to react to the signing of a 
PTA than dyads that mostly trade capital goods. Moreover, PTAs with investment provisions 
have a particularly large effect on other countries’ decisions whether or not to conclude an 
agreement. Finally, as expected by our argument, PTAs with investment provisions stimulate 
the signing of new agreements that also include investment provisions. 
Our contribution to the growing literature on foreign direct investment policy thus is to 
show that international cooperation in this field is not only driven by countries’ desire to 
attract FDI, but also by their attempts at avoiding investment discrimination.34 Of relevance 
for the literature on PTAs, our paper provides ample evidence that modern trade agreements 
are about more than only trade. PTAs clearly also are a tool used by governments to influence 
FDI. Moreover, the scope of PTAs matters for the economic effects of the agreements (see 
also Kono and Rickard 2010). The design of PTAs, in turn, can again at least partly be 
explained as a result of competitive dynamics. If a similar competitive effect also influences 
other features of these agreements, we should expect an increasing convergence on a 
relatively comprehensive model for new trade agreements. That is, we should see always 
fewer agreements that are limited to trade in goods and an increasing share of new agreements 
that contain provisions relating to investments, trade in services, competition and other policy 
fields (as indeed we can observe, see Dür et al. 2013). 
On the broadest level, our paper speaks to a literature that sees international outcomes 
– even systemic ones, such as the new regionalism – as a result of a combination of domestic 
preference formation and strategic interaction in international negotiations (Lake and Powell 
1999; Oatley 2011). Governments clearly take domestic preferences into account when 
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 For studies stressing the FDI attraction aspect, see Büthe and Milner 2008; Haftel 2010; Tobin and Busch 
2010; Jandhyala et al. 2011. 
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considering the pursuit of PTAs. The domestic preferences of countries, however, are 
interdependent: the pursuit of PTAs by some countries influences the domestic preferences in 
other countries, making these also eager to sign PTAs. In explicitly modeling this 
interdependence, the present paper is a contribution to a “nonreductionist IPE” (for this term, 
see Oatley 2011, 335). 
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Table 1: Investment Discrimination and the Spread of Trade Agreements 
Covariates 
Model 1 Model 2  
(dyadic FDI)  
Model 3 
(intermediate 
goods) 
Model 4 
(inv. chapter) 
Model 5  
(inv. chapter 
dependent) 
FDI Discrimination 0.01** 0.06** -0.01   
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)   
Intermediate   -0.02**   
   (0.00)   
FDI Discrimination*   0.003**   
Intermediate   (0.00)   
FDI Discrimination    0.02** 0.09** 
chapter    (0.01) (0.01) 
FDI/GDP 1.11** 1.15** 0.80** 0.99** 1.27** 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.36) 
Trade 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
GDP 0.05** 0.05** 0.06** 0.05** -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
GDPpc 0.03** 0.03* 0.03** 0.03** -0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
GDP Growth -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BIT 0.21** 0.21** 0.23** 0.23** 0.14* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Alliance 0.20** 0.19** 0.21** 0.20** -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) 
Democracy 0.03** 0.03** 0.02** 0.03** 0.08** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Contiguity -0.15* -0.16* -0.16* -0.13* -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) 
Distance -0.58** -0.59** -0.59** -0.58** -0.30** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Island -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16  
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
WTO 0.13** 0.13** 0.12** 0.13** -0.13** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
WTO Round 0.58** 0.58** 0.59** 0.56** 0.80** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Trade Dispute -1.00** -1.20** -1.03** -1.00**  
 (0.32) (0.35) (0.32) (0.32)  
Colony 0.10** 0.09** 0.11** 0.10** 0.13* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Language 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.17** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
Religion 0.10** 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.09* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
PTA Count -0.01 -0.005 -0.01 -0.01 0.13** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) 
Constant 0.81** 0.87** 0.89** 0.88** -2.09** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.33) 
Cubic Polynomials yes yes yes yes Yes 
Observations 217,921 217,921 217,921 217,921 215,400 
Number of dyads 13,451 13,451 13,451 13,451 13,451 
PTAs signed 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,878 312 
Log likelihood -8,492 -8,487 -8,459 -8,317 -1,951 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by dyads. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.  
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Figure 1: FDI outward stocks and the cumulative number of dyads with a preferential trade 
link, 1990-2007 
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Figures 2a-d: Spatial weights for a series of undirected dyads (natural log) 
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The vertical dotted lines indicate the years in which the dyads signed a PTA.  
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Figure 3: Trade in intermediate goods and FDI Discrimination (Model 3) 
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1.) List of preferential trade agreements included in the analysis (Baccini and Dür 
2012) 
 
Table A1: List of PTAs included in the analysis 
Preferential Trade Agreement Year signed Preferential Trade Agreement Year signed 
Afghanistan India 2003 Bulgaria  Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003 
Albania Bulgaria 2003 Bulgaria Czech Republic 1995 
Albania Croatia 2003 Bulgaria EC 1993 
Albania Moldova 2003 Bulgaria EFTA 1993 
Albania Romania 2003 Bulgaria Estonia 2001 
Albania Serbia 2003 Bulgaria Israel 2001 
Albania Turkey 2006 Bulgaria Latvia 2002 
Algeria  EC 2002 Bulgaria Lithuania 2001 
Andean Community 1996 Bulgaria MKD 1999 
Andean countries MERCOSUR 2004 Bulgaria Serbia 2003 
Argentina Brazil 1990 Bulgaria Slovakia 1995 
Argentina Chile 1991 Bulgaria Slovenia 1996 
Argentina Mexico 1993 Bulgaria Turkey 1999 
Armenia Russia 1992 Canada Chile 1996 
Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations China 
2004 Canada Costa Rica 2001 
Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations Korea 
2006 Canada Israel 1996 
Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations FTA 
1992 CARICOM Colombia 1994 
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement 2005 CARICOM Costa Rica 2004 
Australia Singapore 2003 CARICOM Cuba 2000 
Australia Thailand 2004 CARICOM Dominican Republic 1998 
Australia US 2004 CARICOM Venezuela 1992 
Bahrain US 2004 CEN-SAD 1998 
Baltic FTA 1993 Central America Chile 1999 
Bhutan India 2006 Central America Dominican 
Republic 
1998 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia 2000 Central American Integration 
System 
1991 
Bosnia and Herzegovina MKD 2002 Central European FTA 1992 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Moldova 2002 Chile China 2005 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Romania 2003 Chile Colombia 1993 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Slovenia 2001 Chile EC 2002 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Turkey 2003 Chile Ecuador 1994 
Bolivia Chile 1993 Chile EFTA 2003 
Bolivia MERCOSUR 1996 Chile Hong Kong 2005 
Bolivia Mexico 1994 Chile India 2006 
Bolivia Peru 1997 Chile Japan 2007 
Brazil Guyana 2001 Chile Korea 2003 
Brazil Mexico 2002 Chile MERCOSUR 1996 
Brunei Japan 2007 Chile Mexico 1998 
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Chile Panama 2006 EC Slovenia 1996 
Chile Peru 1998 EC South Africa 1999 
Chile US 2003 EC Syria 2004 
Chile Venezuela 1993 EC Tunisia 1995 
China Hong Kong 2003 EC Turkey 1995 
China Pakistan 2006 ECO (Economic Cooperation 
Organization) 
2003 
China Thailand 2003 Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa 
(CEMAC) 
1994 
CIS (Commonwealth of 
Independent States) 
1994 ECOWAS 1993 
Colombia Northern Triangle 2007 Ecuador Paraguay 1994 
Colombia Panama 1993 Ecuador Peru 1997 
Colombia Peru 1997 Ecuador Uruguay 1994 
Colombia US 2006 EFTA Egypt 2007 
COMESA 1994 EFTA Estonia 1995 
Costa Rica Mexico 1994 EFTA Hungary 1993 
Costa Rica Panama 2002 EFTA Israel 1992 
Croatia EC 2001 EFTA Jordan 2001 
Croatia EFTA 2001 EFTA Korea 2005 
Croatia Lithuania 2002 EFTA Latvia 1995 
Croatia MKD 1997 EFTA Lebanon 2004 
Croatia Moldova 2004 EFTA Lithuania 1995 
Croatia Serbia 2004 EFTA Mexico 2000 
Croatia Turkey 2002 EFTA MKD 2000 
Cuba Ecuador 2000 EFTA Morocco 1997 
Cuba Peru 2000 EFTA Poland 1992 
Czech Republic EC 1992 EFTA Romania 1992 
Czech Republic EFTA 1992 EFTA SACU 2006 
Czech Republic Israel 1996 EFTA Singapore 2002 
Czech Republic Latvia 1993 EFTA Slovakia 1992 
Czech Republic Romania 1994 EFTA Slovenia 1995 
Czech Republic Slovenia 1993 EFTA Tunisia 2004 
Czech Republic Turkey 1998 EFTA Turkey 1991 
D8 PTA 2006 Egypt Turkey 2005 
DR-CAFTA 2004 El Salvador Mexico 1993 
EC Egypt 2001 Estonia Hungary 1998 
EC Estonia 1995 Estonia Slovakia 1998 
EC Hungary 1992 Estonia Slovenia 1997 
EC Jordan 1997 Estonia Turkey 1996 
EC Latvia 1995 Estonia Ukraine 1995 
EC Lebanon 2002 Estonia Latvia Lithuania Norway 1992 
EC Lithuania 1995 Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Switzerland 
1992 
EC Mexico 2000 GAFTA 1997 
EC MKD 2001 Georgia Turkey 2007 
EC Morocco 1996 Group of Three 1994 
EC Poland 1992 Guatemala Mexico 1993 
EC Romania 1993 Gulf Cooperation Council 2001 
EC Slovakia 1992 Guyana Venezuela 1990 
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Honduras Mexico 1993 Malaysia Pakistan 2007 
Hungary Israel 1998 Mauritius Pakistan 2007 
Hungary Latvia 1999 Melanesian Spearhead Group 
(MSG) 
1997 
Hungary Lithuania 1998 MERCOSUR Mexico 2002 
Hungary Poland 1991 MERCOSUR 1991 
Hungary Serbia 2002 Mexico Nicaragua 1997 
Hungary Slovakia 1991 Mexico Peru 1995 
Hungary Turkey 1998 Mexico Uruguay 2003 
India MERCOSUR 2004 MKD Romania 2003 
India Nepal 1991 MKD Slovenia 1996 
India Singapore 2005 MKD Turkey 2000 
India Sri Lanka 1998 MKD Ukraine 2001 
Indonesia Japan 2007 Moldova MKD 2004 
Iran Pakistan 2004 Moldova Romania 1995 
Israel MERCOSUR 2007 Moldova Serbia 2003 
Israel Mexico 2000 Morocco Turkey 2004 
Israel Poland 1998 Morocco US 2004 
Israel Romania 2001 NAFTA 1992 
Israel Slovakia 1997 New Zealand Singapore 2000 
Israel Slovenia 1998 New Zealand Thailand 2005 
Israel Turkey 1997 Oman US 2006 
Japan Malaysia 2005 Pakistan Sri Lanka 2002 
Japan Mexico 2004 Panama Singapore 2006 
Japan Philippines 2006 Panama US 2007 
Japan Singapore 2002 Peru Singapore 2007 
Japan Thailand 2007 Peru US 2006 
Jordan Singapore 2004 Peru Venezuela 1997 
Jordan US 2000 Poland Turkey 2000 
Korea Singapore 2005 Romania Serbia 2004 
Korea US 2007 Romania Slovakia 1994 
Laos Thailand 1991 Romania Turkey 1997 
Latvia Poland 1999 SADC 1992 
Latvia Slovakia 1997 SAPTA 1993 
Latvia Slovenia 1996 Singapore US 2003 
Latvia Turkey 2000 Slovakia Slovenia 1993 
Latvia Ukraine 1995 Slovakia Turkey 1998 
Lithuania Poland 1997 Slovenia Turkey 2000 
Lithuania Slovakia 1997 Syria Turkey 2004 
Lithuania Slovenia 1997 Trans Pacific Strategic EPA 2005 
Lithuania Turkey 1998 Tunisia Turkey 2004 
Lithuania Ukraine 1995   
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2.) Countries in the dataset 
 
 
Table A2: List of countries included into the analysis. 
Country 
Afghanistan Dominica Kazakhstan 
Albania Dominican Republic Kenya 
Algeria Ecuador Korea (Republic of) 
Angola Egypt Kuwait 
Argentina El Salvador Kyrgyzstan 
Armenia Equatorial Guinea Lao People's Democratic Republic 
Australia Eritrea Latvia 
Austria Estonia Lebanon 
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Lesotho 
Bahamas Fiji Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Bahrain Finland Lithuania 
Bangladesh France Luxembourg 
Barbados Gabon Madagascar 
Belarus Gambia Malawi 
Belgium Georgia Malaysia 
Belize Germany Mali 
Benin Ghana Malta 
Bhutan Greece Mauritania 
Bolivia Grenada Mauritius 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guatemala Mexico 
Botswana Guinea Moldova (Republic of) 
Brazil Guinea-Bissau Mongolia 
Brunei Darussalam Guyana Morocco 
Bulgaria Haiti Mozambique 
Burkina Faso Honduras Namibia 
Burundi Hungary Nepal 
Cambodia Iceland Netherlands 
Cameroon India New Zealand 
Canada Indonesia Nicaragua 
Cape Verde Iran (Islamic Republic of) Niger 
Central African Republic Iraq Nigeria 
Chad Ireland Norway 
Chile Israel Oman 
China Italy Pakistan 
Colombia Lebanon Panama 
Comoros Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Papua New Guinea 
Congo Sri Lanka Paraguay 
Congo (Democratic Republic of the) Lesotho Peru 
Costa Rica Lithuania Philippines 
Côte d'Ivoire Luxembourg Poland 
Croatia Latvia Portugal 
Cuba Morocco Qatar 
Cyprus Moldova (Republic of) Romania 
Czech Republic Jamaica Russian Federation 
Denmark Japan Rwanda 
Djibouti Jordan Saudi Arabia 
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Senegal Swaziland Turkmenistan 
Serbia Sweden Uganda 
Seychelles Switzerland Ukraine 
Sierra Leone Syrian Arab Republic United Arab Emirates 
Singapore Tajikistan United Kingdom 
Slovakia Tanzania (United Republic of) United States 
Slovenia Thailand Uruguay 
Somalia The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
Uzbekistan 
South Africa Togo Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
Spain Trinidad and Tobago Viet Nam 
Sri Lanka Tunisia Zambia 
Sudan Turkey Zimbabwe 
Suriname   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
3.) Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A3: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Data 
sources 
FDI DISCRIMINATION (MONADIC)  3.51 3.53 0 16.37 (1) (2) 
FDI DISCRIMINATION (DYADIC) 0.11 0.71 0 12.27 (1) (2) 
FDI DISCRIMINATION (MONADIC) – INV. 1.18 2.72 0 16.20 (1) (2) 
FDI DISCRIMINATION (DYADIC) –INV. 0.03 0.39 0 12.15 (1) (2) 
FDI/GDP 0.01 0.03 0 0.83 (2) 
TRADE (LOGGED) 1.96 2.37 0 12.46 (3) 
GDP (LOGGED) 2.88 1.94 0.10 9.49 (3) 
GDP PER CAPITA (LOGGED) 6.55 1.22 4.24 10.59 (3) 
GDP GROWTH 0.57 6.45 -50.25 38.00 (3) 
BIT 0.11 0.31 0 1 (4) 
ALLIANCE 0.15 0.37 0 1 (5) 
DEMOCRACY 2.42 1.71 1 7 (6) 
CONTIGUITY 0.02 0.14 0 1 (7) 
DISTANCE (LOGGED) 8.71 0.75 2.44 9.89 (7) 
ISLAND 0.13 0.33 0 1 (7) 
WTO 0.54 0.50 0 1 (8) 
 WTO ROUND 0.66 0.47 0 1 (8) 
TRADE DISPUTE 0.01 0.07 0 1 (9) 
COLONY 0.16 0.37 0 1 (7) 
LANGUAGE 0.09 0.29 0 1 (7) 
RELIGION 0.16 0.37 0 1 (10) 
PTA COUNT (LOGGED) 2.59 1.30 0 4.79 (1) 
FDI ATTRACTION 4.74 3.90 0 15.84 (1) (2) 
SPATIAL DISTANCE 0.001 0.01 0 2.19 (1) (7) 
SPATIAL DISTANCE2 0.0001 0.02 0 4.80 (1) (7) 
Sources: (1) Baccini and Dür 2013; (2) UNCTAD 2010b; (3) IMF 2008; (4) UNCTAD 2010a; (5) Correlates of War 
dataset; (6) Freedom House 2007; (7) CEPII 2006; (8) World Trade Organization 2008; (9) Horn and Mavroidis 2006; 
(10) Encyclopedia Britannica 2001. 
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4.) Model Fit 
 
We assess the overall fit of our model by looking at the percent of correctly predicted PTAs. 
Wooldridge (2002) notes that this percentage may be misleading if the two outcomes of the 
dependent variable, i.e. zero and one, are examined at the same time. Put simply, although the 
model might correctly predict very few 1s (so called “true positives”), the percentage of 
correctly predicted 0s might be high (so called “true negatives”), leaving the impression that 
the model has high explanatory power. Following his suggestion, we separately examine the 
percentage of correctly 0s and 1s. Furthermore, we also report the percentage of “false 
positive”, i.e. dyads without a PTA for which our model would predict one.35 
As Baier and Bergstrand (2010: 40) point out, “a critical issue in classification is the 
choice of the ‘cutoff’ on the probability continuum.” In the case of predicting PTAs, the usual 
cutoff point of 0.5 is not very relevant, since PTAs are rare events (Baier and Bergstrand 
2010: 41). Thus, we follow Cohen et al. (2003) who suggest using a priori information about 
the proportion of 0s and 1s in the population. Using that measure, our cutoff point is 0.01 for 
the whole sample of PTAs and 0.001 for the PTAs that include investment provisions. Table 
A4 reports the number and the percentage of PTAs correctly predicted, true negatives, and 
false positives for both all PTAs (Model 1) and PTAs with investment provisions (Model 4). 
Our models provide excellent fits in both cases. 
Finally, we follow Fawcett (2006) in measuring the overall fit of our models by 
examining the area underneath the “ROC” curve. An ROC curve graphs the true positive rate 
against the false positive rate, which is one minus the true negative rate. The fit of a model is 
perfect when the area under the curve is 1. In this ideal case the “true positive” rate is one, 
                                                 
35
 We categorize observations as false positive if and only if dyads do not form a PTA over 
the entire period under investigation. 
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whereas the “false positive” rate is zero. Figures A1 and A2 provide the ROC curves for 
Models 1 and 5, respectively. In both cases, the area under the ROC curve is 0.89. This 
confirms the good fit of our models. 
 
Table A4: Correctly predicted PTAs 
 True Positive True Negative False Positive 
 Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number 
All PTAs 79 1,484 83 180,026 13 27,963 
PTAs with investment 
provisions 
78 243 74 161,869 21 46,579 
 
Figures A1 and A2: ROC curves for Models 1 and 5 
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5.) Further Results 
 
Table A5: Robustness checks I 
Covariates 
A1 
(instrumental 
variables) 
A2  
(interaction 
term) 
A3 
(FDI 
attraction) 
A4 
(Year fixed 
effects) 
A5 
(Region fixed 
effects) 
FDI Discrimination 0.02**   0.01** 0.02** 
 (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) 
FDI Discrimination I  -2.96**    
  (0.83)    
FDI Discrimination II  -0.001    
  (0.00)    
FDI Discrimination I *  0.22**    
FDI DiscriminationII  (0.06)    
FDI Attraction   0.004   
   (0.00)   
FDI/GDP 1.05** 1.52** 1.24** 1.06** 0.34 
 (0.29) (0.37) (0.29) (0.30) (0.36) 
Trade 0.01** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GDP 0.06** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.09** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDPpc -0.02** 0.04** 0.04** 0.03* 0.15** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP Growth -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BIT 0.20** 0.22** 0.21** 0.25** 0.29** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Alliance 0.17** 0.21** 0.20** 0.22** 0.28** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Democracy 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 0.03** -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Contiguity -0.15** -0.16* -0.15* -0.18** -0.20** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Distance -0.62** -0.58** -0.58** -0.62** -0.62** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Island -0.28** -0.17 -0.17 -0.19 -0.17 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
WTO 0.10** 0.14** 0.13** 0.15** 0.11** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
WTO Round -1.13** 0.58** 0.58** -0.57 0.55** 
 (0.14) (0.03) (0.03) (0.42) (0.03) 
Trade Dispute 0.57** -1.01** -1.00** -1.06** -1.01** 
 (0.04) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.33) 
Colony 0.12** 0.10** 0.10** 0.08* 0.09* 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Language 0.16** 0.16** 0.15** 0.11* 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Religion 0.09** 0.10** 0.11** 0.10** 0.17** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
PTA Count -0.04* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Residuals 0.01*     
 (0.00)     
Constant 1.47** 0.77** 0.79** 0.95** 0.95** 
 (0.13) (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.32) 
Cubic Polynomials yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 217,921 217,921 217,921 217,921 217,921 
Number of dyads 13,451 13,451 13,451 13,451 13,451 
PTAs signed 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,878 
Log likelihood -8,420 -8,489 -8,425 -8,161 -8,137 
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Table A6: EU as single actor 
Covariates  
A6 
Main model 
A7 
(Invest Ch.) 
A8 
(Invest ch. 
dependent 
variable) 
      
FDI Discrimination 0.02** 
 (0.00) 
FDI Discrimination chapter 0.03** 0.09** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
FDI/GDP 2.24** 1.95** 1.91** 
 
(0.44) (0.44) (0.53) 
Trade 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP 0.03* 0.02 -0.03 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
GDPpc -0.00 -0.01 -0.04 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
GDP Growth -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BIT 0.21** 0.22** 0.09 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
Alliance 0.19** 0.19** -0.11 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Democracy 0.01* 0.02** 0.05** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Contiguity -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.13) 
Distance -0.58** -0.59** -0.35** 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Island -0.11 -0.10 
(0.12) (0.12) 
WTO 0.11** 0.10** -0.15** 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
WTO Round 0.61** 0.60** 0.78** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Trade Dispute -0.51 -0.50 
(0.39) (0.39) 
Colony 0.09* 0.09* 0.09 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Language 0.16** 0.15** 0.18* 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) 
Religion 0.08** 0.07* 0.05 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
PTA Count -0.03* -0.02 0.13** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 1.09** 1.16** -1.49** 
(0.29) (0.30) (0.35) 
Cubic Polynomials yes yes yes 
Observations 182,336 179,982 179,982 
Number of dyads 11,865 11,712 11,712 
PTAs signed 1,561 1,561 293 
Log likelihood -7,064 -6,919 -1,815 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by dyads. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05. 
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Table A7: Robustness Checks II 
Covariates 
A9 
(smaller 
value) 
A10 
(3 years) 
A11 
(7 years) 
A12 
(distance) 
A13 
(few 
controls) 
FDI Discrimination 0.03** 0.02** 0.01** 0.01** 0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
FDI/GDP out 1.19** 1.10** 1.11** 1.22** 0.76** 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.28) (0.23) 
Trade 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02**  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
GDP 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05**  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
GDPpc 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
GDP Growth -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01**  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  
BIT 0.22** 0.21** 0.21** 0.20**  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
Alliance 0.20** 0.20** 0.20** 0.20**  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
Democracy 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
Contiguity -0.16* -0.16* -0.15* -0.12  
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)  
Distance -0.58** -0.58** -0.58** -0.58**  
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)  
Island -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17  
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)  
WTO 0.13** 0.13** 0.13** 0.12**  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
WTO Round 0.58** 0.57** 0.58** 0.59**  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
Trade Dispute -1.01** -0.99** -1.00** -0.99**  
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32)  
Colony 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.09**  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)  
Language 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.17**  
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)  
Religion 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.11**  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  
PTA Count -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Spatial distance    28.97**  
    (6.37)  
(Spatial distance)2    -753.74**  
    (173.22)  
Constant 0.83** 0.82** 0.81** 0.82** -2.43** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.17) (0.02) 
Cubic polynomials yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 217,921 217,921 217,921 217,921 217,921 
Number of dyads 13,451 13,451 13,451 13,451 13,451 
PTAs signed 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,878 
Log likelihood -8,493 -8,490 -8,491 -8,453 -10,754 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by dyads. ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05.  
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Table A8: Survival analysis (Cox model) 
Covariates 
A14 A15 
(dyadic 
FDI)  
A16 
(intermediate 
goods) 
A17 
(inv. 
chapter) 
A18 
(inv. chapter 
dependent) 
FDI Discrimination 0.02** 0.13** -0.01 
 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Intermediate -0.03** 
 
(0.01) 
FDI Discrimination* 0.01** 
Intermediate (0.00) 
FDI Discrimination 0.04** 0.25** 
Chapter (0.01) (0.02) 
FDI/GDP 1.10** 1.52 0.68 1.27 4.07** 
 
(0.26) (0.80) (0.83) (0.81) (0.77) 
Trade 0.02** 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.05 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
GDP 0.05** 0.11** 0.11** 0.09** -0.06 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
GDPpc 0.03* 0.11* 0.11** 0.11** -0.17** 
 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
GDP Growth -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.02** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
BIT 0.21** 0.61** 0.63** 0.65** 0.25 
 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.19) 
Alliance 0.20** 0.50** 0.53** 0.50** -0.27 
 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.17) 
Democracy 0.03** 0.07** 0.06** 0.07** 0.20** 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Contiguity -0.16** -0.70** -0.70** -0.65** -0.31 
 
(0.05) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.32) 
Distance -0.58** -1.09** -1.08** -1.08** -0.59** 
 
(0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Island -0.17 -0.46 -0.48 -0.48 
 
(0.12) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) 
WTO 0.13** 0.40** 0.39** 0.41** -0.28 
 
(0.03) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) 
WTO Round 0.58** 1.18** 1.21** 1.16** 1.64** 
 
(0.02) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) 
Trade Dispute -1.00** -3.11** -2.82** -2.75** 
 
(0.15) (1.03) (1.01) (1.01) 
Colony 0.10** 0.35** 0.36** 0.36** 0.32* 
 
(0.02) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) 
Language 0.15** 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.28 
 
(0.03) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) 
Religion 0.10** 0.26** 0.25** 0.24** 0.21 
 
(0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.14) 
PTA Count -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 0.07 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
Observations 217,921 217,921 217,921 215,400 228,978 
Number of dyads 13,451 13,451 13,451 13,451 13,451 
PTAs signed (failures) 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,878 312 
Log likelihood -15,796 -15,795 -15,771 -15,401 -2,700 
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by dyads. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table A9: Bootstrap standard errors 
Covariates 
A19 A20  
(dyadic FDI)  
A21 
(intermediate 
goods) 
A22 
(inv. chapter) 
A23 
(inv. chapter 
dependent) 
FDI Discrimination 0.01** 0.06** -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)   
Intermediate   -0.02**   
   (0.00)   
FDI Discrimination*   0.003**   
Intermediate   (0.00)   
FDI Discrimination    0.02** 0.09** 
chapter    (0.01) (0.01) 
FDI/GDP 1.11** 1.15** 0.80** 0.99** 1.27** 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.34) 
Trade 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
GDP 0.05** 0.05** 0.06** 0.05** -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
GDPpc 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
GDP Growth -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
BIT 0.21** 0.21** 0.23** 0.23** 0.14* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) 
Alliance 0.20** 0.19** 0.21** 0.20** -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
Democracy 0.03** 0.03** 0.02** 0.03** 0.08** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Contiguity -0.15* -0.16** -0.16** -0.13* -0.01 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) 
Distance -0.58** -0.59** -0.59** -0.58** -0.30** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Island -0.17 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16  
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09)  
WTO 0.13** 0.13** 0.12** 0.13** -0.13* 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) 
WTO Round 0.58** 0.58** 0.59** 0.56** 0.80** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) 
Trade Dispute -1.00** -1.20** -1.03** -1.00**  
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)  
Colony 0.10** 0.09** 0.11** 0.10** 0.13* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) 
Language 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.17** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) 
Religion 0.10** 0.11** 0.10** 0.10** 0.09 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
PTA Count -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.13** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 0.81** 0.87** 0.89** 0.86** -2.09** 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.15) (0.12) (0.29) 
Cubic Polynomials yes yes yes yes yes 
Number of dyads 13,451 13,451 13,451 13,451 13,451 
PTAs signed 1,878 1,878 1,878 1,878 312 
Log likelihood -8,492 -8,487 -8,459 -8,317 -1,951 
Observations 217,921 217,921 217,921 215,400 215,400 
Bootstrapped standard errors (100 replications). ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Figure A3: The interaction effect between FDI Discrimination I and FDI Discrimination II 
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The dotted lines are the 95% confidence intervals. The histogram at the bottom shows the 
distribution of the variable FDI Discrimination I. 
 
Figure A4: The hazard rate (Model A8) 
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6.) Intermediate Goods 
 
BEC data were only available consistently from 1998 on. For years before 1998 we rely on 
two types of data. First, for the years 1996 and 1997 we use a correspondence between HS96 
and BEC to convert HS data to BEC data. Second, the years before 1996 are in the original 
HS coding system. We used the aforementioned concordance to convert these data first to 
HS96 data and then to BEC data. Because an HS88 category could be in several HS96 
categories, we divided imports and exports by the number of duplicated HS88 categories, 
assuming that the goods divided equally into the new category. Finally, we note that there are 
three BEC categories that do not map nicely onto the capital goods, intermediate goods, and 
consumption goods categories (they are categories 32, 51, and 7). We left those categories out 
of intermediate goods and include each of them in a separate category.36 
                                                 
36
 Our results are not sensitive to this decision, that is, we obtain similar results if we include these three 
categories in the category of intermediate goods. 
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